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Abstract 
Can	a	specific	class	of	borrowers	be	 treated	discriminatorily	even	 if	 (1)	 the	class	
is	identical	with	the	remainder	of	the	population	in	terms	of	their	ability	and	their	
use	of	borrowed	money,	and	also	(2)	lenders	are	rational	and	competitive?	Unlike	
most	of	the	existing	statistical discrimination	literature,	the	endogenous	discrimination	
in	 this	paper	does	not	 involve	hidden	actions	which	are	distinct	between	 the	
discriminated-against	and	the	discriminated-for.	Thereby	 it	 is	successfully	shown	
that	a	discriminatory	self-fulfilling	prophecy	can	be	endogenously	sustained	even	
when	 the	class	of	borrowers	do	nothing	“blameworthy”	 to	contribute	 to	such	a	
prophecy.
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1．Introduction
	 STATISTICAL	DISCRIMINATION	literature,	 represented	by	Arrow	 (1973)	and	
Coate	and	Loury	 (1993)	 inter alia,	has	 it	 that	 if	an	externally recognisable	class	 (e.g.,	
a　race,	or	a	gender)	of	workers	were	to	expect	discriminatorily	 lower	wages	than	
other	classes,	 then	such	a	class	would	have	accordingly	 lower	 incentives	 to	 invest	
in	 their	own	productive	human	capital,	which	 in	 turn	would	 legitimise	 the	wage	
discrimination	as	an	accurate	 self fulfilling prophecy	 for	 the	actual	productivity	of	
different	classes	of	workers.	Thereby	 in	 the	presence	of	multiple equilibria,	 there	
can	be	a	separating equilibrium	where	different	classes	of	workers	reside	 in	different	
equilibria,	even	if	workers	from	different	classes	are	a priori identical	in	the	sense	that	
their	externally	 recognisable	 features	have	no	 inherent	effect	on	 their	economic	
productivity.	This	 theory	provides	a	neat,	 incisive	 response	 to	 its	civil-rights-era	
predecessor,	the	old	assertion	that	race	and	gender	discrimination	could	uphold	only	
if	employers	were	economically	irrational.
	 Analogies	can	be	applied	 to	other	markets	 than	 labour	markets	as	well.	 In	a	
credit	market,	as	 is	well	known,	unfavourable	 lending	conditions	can	encourage	
moral hazard	on	the	borrowers’	side.	Thereby	if	a	class	of	borrowers	are	treated	less	
favourably	 than	others,	 then	they	are	 likely	 to	use	 the	 fund	 in	“hazardous”	ways,	
which	in	turn	justifies	the	unfavourable	treatment	from	the	lenders’	side.
	 According	 to	 this	 theory,	 it	 remains	 technically	unclear	who	 is	 to	 “blame”	
in	 the	 first	 place.	Namely,	 since	 the	 low	human	 capital	 investment	made	by	
the	discriminated-against	 class	 and	 the	discriminatory	 treatment	 they	 receive	
in	 the	 economy	 are	 complementing	 each	 other,	 both	 the	 discriminator	 and	
the	discriminated-against	 are	 contributing	 to	 the	discriminatory	 self-fulfilling	
expectations.	 Viewed	more	 practically,	 this	 leads	 to	 a	 pragmatic	 question	
whether	discrimination	would	disappear	once	all	 the	hidden	actions	 taken	by	 the	
discriminated-against	group	were	somehow	monitored,	controlled	and	corrected	
appropriately.	In	other	words,	can	discrimination	self-sustain	without	“cooperation”	
of	the	discriminated-against?
	 This	 paper	 probes	 the	 possibility	 that	 lenders’	 discriminatory	 actions	
alone,	without	borrowers’	moral	hazard	or	any	hidden	action	at	all,	 self-sustain	
as	 a	 competitive	 equilibrium.	The	basic	model	 is	 laid	out	 in	 section	2.	Credit	
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discrimination	by	denial	to	lend	money	is	discussed	in	section	3.	Discrimination	in	
terms	of	 interest	 rates	 is	 then	discussed	 in	section	4.	Section	5	 informally	probes	
the	seemingly	paradoxical	prospect	 that	a	 less	 than	perfectly	competitive	credit	
market	might	eliminate	some	aspects	of	discrimination.	Possible	 (counter)effects	of	
legally	prohibiting	discrimination	are	discussed	in	section	6.	A	concluding	remark	is	
provided	in	section	7.
2．The model
	 There	are	two	externally recognisable	classes	of	borrowers.	These	two	classes	are	
labelled	W	and	B.	To	run	his/her	business,	a	borrower	needs	to	be	always	borrowing	
one	unit	of	 fund	without	 interruption.	The	 lending	 term	of	a	 loan	 is	nevertheless	
finite1）,	hence	at	the	maturity	of	each	term	the	borrower	must	find	a	new	loan,	or	
else	go	out	of	business.
	 The	key	observation	 that	motivates	 this	model	 is	 the	possibility	 that	whether	
a	borrower	can	repay	the	previous	 loan	that	 is	about	 to	mature	 is	not	necessarily	
independent	of	the	continuation	or	discontinuation	of	his/her	business.	Theoretically,	
this	 influence	can	materialise	 in	either	direction,	but	perhaps	 the	most	 interesting	
case	to	observe	is	that	the	continuation	of	his/her	business	facilitates	the	borrower	
to	repay	his/her	previous	loan.
	 This	translates	into	the	following.	At	the	end	of	each	lending	term,	a	borrower	
is	in	one	of	the	three	states.
Success	 (probability	 s):	The	 loan	can	be	 repayed	unconditionally,	whether	 the	
borrower	continues	his/her	business	or	not.
Refinancible failure	 (probability	 f ):	The	 loan	can	be	 repayed	 if	and	only	 if	 the	
borrower	continues	his/her	business.
Insolvency	(probability	1	−	s	−	f ):	The	loan	cannot	be	repayed.
1）It	 is	outside	 the	 scope	of	 this	paper	 to	question	why	a	 loan	has	a	 finite	 term.	Nonetheless,	 the	
implication	of	a	 longer-term	relationship	maintained	by	a	specific	 lender-borrower	pair	shall	be	very	
briefly	discussed	in	section	5.
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These	probabilities	 vary across borrowers.	 Lenders	 can,	based	upon	 statistically	
published	data,	assess	each	borrower’s	 idiosyncratic	probability	parameters	s	and	 f,	
based	upon	the	borrower’s	objectively verifiable	personal	profiles	 (such	as	education	
and	criminal	 records).	These	parameters	are	unaffected,	however,	by	whether	 the	
borrower	belongs	to	class	W	or	class	B.
	 Obviously,	 given	 that	 the	 continuation	of	his/her	business	 can	enhance	a	
borrower’s	ability	to	repay	his/her	previous	loan,	an	intertemporally	eﬃcient	scheme	
would	be	 for	 the	same	 lender	 to	help	 the	borrower	 refinance	his/her	business	a	
term	after	another,	so	as	 to	maximise	the	possibility	of	 its	continuation.	In	reality,	
however,	there	is	no	guarantee	that	the	lending	decision	this	term	and	the	lending	
decision	next	 term	are	undertaken	by	 the	 same	 individual.	What	 if	 the	 lender	
discontinues	lending	funds	to	the	specific	kind	of	industry	or	business?	What	if,	even	
within	 the	same	 lending	 institution,	a	new	fund	manager	 takes	over	 the	old	one?	
And	what	if	a	fund	manager’s	job	hinges	upon	how	many	of	his/her	loans	have	been	
promptly	repayed?	The	gist	here	is	that,	in	many	of	these	very	realistic	scenarios,	the	
lending	decisions	are	not	always	made	in	the	most	intertemporally	eﬃcient	way.
	 Fund	managers’	 “myopia”	can	be	 taken	 into	account	as	 follows.	Each	 fund	
manager	knows	that	 there	 is	a	positive	probability	 that	 the	same	borrower	will	be	
dealt	with	by	another	 fund	manager.	Thereby	the	probability	 that	 the	 loan	can	be	
repayed	at	its	maturity	is	s ＋νf	whereν＝ 1	if	and	only	if	all	other	fund	managers	
are	willing	to	lend	a	fund	to	the	borrower,	and	in	general ν is	strictly	increasing	in	
the	fraction	of	other	fund	managers	who	are	willing	to	lend	to	the	same	borrower.
	 All	 fund	managers	are	assumed	 to	be	a priori	 identical	 and,	aside	 from	 the	
aforementioned	“myopia”,	competitive.	The	risk-free	interest	rate	in	the	economy	is	
denoted	by	r	and	the	interest	rate	for	risky	loans	is	denoted	generally	by	r	where	r	>	
r.	Throughout	the	paper,	it	is	assumed	for	computational	simplicity2）	that	no	partial	
repayment	can	be	made.	That	 is,	 the	lender	loses	the	whole	amount	of	the	loan	if	
the	loan	is	not	fully	repayed.
2）It	is	obvious	that	this	assumption	is	not	at	all	crucial	to	any	of	the	qualitative	findings	in	this	paper.
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3．Discriminatory lending denial
	 Suppose	 first	 that	 fund	managers	 offer	 an	 exogenously	 fixed	 rate	 r	 to	 all	
borrowers,	so	that	the	only	decision	for	fund	managers	is	to	select	which	borrowers	
to	lend	and	which	borrowers	to	decline.
	 Generally,	a	 fund	manager	 should	 issue	a	 loan	 if	 and	only	 if	 the	borrower	
satisfies
(s ＋νf )	(1 ＋ r)	≥ 1 ＋	r	
whereν is,	as	aforementioned,	 the	probability	 that	 the	borrower	can	continue	his/
her	business,	which	is	an	increasing	function	of	the	fraction	of	other	fund	managers	
who	are	also	willing	to	lend	to	this	borrower,	denoted	henceforth	by	θ	,	and ν＝ 1	if	
and	only	if	the	fraction	of	such	fund	managers	is	1.
	 In	particular,	 if	all	other	 fund	managers	 in	 the	economy	apply	 the	 identical	
decision	rule	A,	 that	 is,	accepting	borrowers	 if	and	only	 if	 they	satisfy	 {s,	 f } ∈ A	
where	A ⊂	IR 2＋ ,	then	the	fund	manager	should	accept	the	borrower	if	and	only	if	:
　　(s ＋ f )	(1 ＋ r) ≥	1 ＋ r	　when	(s,	f )	∈ A	,	or
　　(s ＋ν0	f )	(1 ＋ r) ≥	1 ＋ r　	when	(s,	f )	∈/	A
where ν0	is	the	probability ν when	no	other	fund	manager	is	willing	to	lend	to	the	
borrower.
	 Hence	the	following	equilibrium	characterisation	is	obtained.
Proposition 1	 :	Given	a	 fixed	 interest	rate	 r	>	 r,	all	 fund	managers’	adopting	 the	
decision	rule	A	such	that
　
　　　　　(s,	f )	∈ A　∀ (s,	f )	such	that	(s ＋ν0	f )	(1 ＋ r) ≥	1 ＋ r	,
　　　　　　(s,	f )
	
∈/	A　∀ (s,	f )	such	that	(s ＋ f )	(1 ＋ r) <	1 ＋ r	,
	 is	a	competitive	equilibrium.
Note	that	there	are	many	A	satisfying	these	criteria.	Figure	1	illustrates	the	vast
multiplicity	of	equilibria	in	this	model.	Any	acceptance	set	A	satisfying
A	⊆	(	X ＋ Y )　and　A ⊇ X
is	a	competitive	equilibrium.
(3.1)
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Intuitively,	 the	 region	X	 in	 figure	1	 is	 the	set	of	 those	borrowers	whose	success	
probability	 is	 so	high	 that	 every	 fund	manager	must,	 as	 long	as	 economically	
rational,	accept	them.	The	region	Z,	on	the	other	hand,	is	the	set	of	those	borrowers	
whose	s ＋ f	are	unacceptably	low.	The	region	Y,	however,	 is	up	to	fund	managers’	
discretion	in	the	sense	that,	if	all	other	fund	managers	accept	a	subset	of	Y	then	it	is	
the	unique best response	by	each	fund	manager	to	accept	the	exact	same	subset	of	Y.
	 Note	 further	 that	 fund	managers	may	apply	different	 acceptance	 rules	 for	
W-class	borrowers	and	B-class	borrowers.	The	following	Corollary	can	be	viewed	as	
a	generalisation	of	Proposition	1.
Corollary1:	All	fund	managers’	adopting	the	identical	pair	of	decision	rules	(AW,	AB),	
that	is	to	apply	the	acceptance	set	AW	for	W-class	borrowers	whilst	applying	AB	
for	B-class	borrowers,	is	an	equilibrium	if	and	only	if
　　　
　(s,	f ) ∈ AW ,	　(s,	f ) ∈ AB　∀ (s,	f )	such	that	(s ＋ν0	f )	(1 ＋ r)	≥	1 ＋ r,
　　　　(s,	f ) ∈/	AW ,	　(s,	f ) ∈/	AB　∀ (s,	f )	such	that	(s ＋	f )	(1 ＋ r)	<	1	+	r.
In	words,	 the	fund	managers’	discretion	over	Y	can	be	exercised	conditional	upon	
the	borrowers’	classes.	Namely,	if	all	other	fund	managers	impose	a	discriminatory	
lending	 rule	 by	 accepting	 two	different	 subsets	 of	Y	 for	W-class	 and	B-class	
borrowers,	then	the	unique best response	by	each	fund	manager	is	to	adopt	the	exact	
same	pair	of	subsets.
	 Using	 the	same	notation	as	 in	Figure	1,	 for	example,	 if	all	borrowers	adopt	
AW ＝ X ＋ Y	and	AB ＝ X,	 then	 it	 is	a	self-sustained	competitive	equilibrium	that	
discriminates	for	class	W	and	against	class	B.
Figure1:	the	“must-accept”	set	(X ) 	and	the	“may-accept”	set	(Y ) .
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4．Discriminatory lending rates
	 Now	consider	endogenising	 the	 interest	 rate	 r.	The	rationality	condition	 for	a	
fund	manager’s	decision	is	basically	the	same	as	(3.1)	in	the	previous	section,	except	
that	s	and	f	can	depend	upon	r.	Generally,	both	s	and	s ＋ f	decrease	in	r.
	 The	problem	now	has	 two	dimensions.	One	 is	whether	a	borrower	 is	eligible	
for	a	loan	at	all.	The	other	problem	is	to	determine	the	competitive	rate	when	the	
borrower	is	eligible	for	a	loan.
	 The	fund	manager’s	optimal	acceptance decision	is	to	lend	to	a	borrower	with	s [·]	
and	f [·]	if	and	only	if	there	exists	an	r	satisfying	(3.1)	which,	making	the	endogeneity
of	s	and	f	explicit,	can	be	rewritten	as
(s	[r] ＋νf	[r])	(1 ＋ r) ≥	1 ＋ r.	
Assuming	that	for	an	extraordinarily	high	rate	r	the	probabilities	s [r]	and	f [r]converge	
to	zero	faster than	r,	that	is
the	 left-hand	side	of	 (4.1)	can	be	plotted	against	 r	as	 in	Figure	2.	Namely,	as	 in	
section	3,	borrowers	can	be	classified	into	the	following	three	categories.
X :		The	set	of	those	borrowers	with	s [·],	f [·]	such	that	there	exists	an	r	satisfying
	 (s [r] ＋ν0		f	[r])	(1 ＋ r) ≥	1 ＋ r.
Y :		The	set	of	those	borrowers	with	s [·],	f [·]	such	that	there	exists	an	r	satisfying	
	 (s [r]＋ f	[r])	(1＋ r)≥	1＋ r,	but	that	there	exists	no	r	satisfying	(s [r]＋ν0		f	[r])	(1＋ r)≥	
1 ＋ r.
	 The	lowest ν with	which	there	exists	an	r	satisfying	(s [r] ＋ f	[r])	(1 ＋ r) ≥	1 ＋ r	is	
denoted	as	ν
∧
,	and	the	fraction	of	fund	managers	accepting	the	borrower	which	
entails	this	conditional	probability ν
∧
is	henceforth	denoted	by θ
∧
.
Z :	The	set	of	those	borrowers	with	s [·],	f [·]	such	that	there	exists	no	r	satisfying
	 (s [r] ＋ f	[r])	(1 ＋ r) ≥	1 ＋ r.
(4.1)
r↗∞
lim	(s [r] ＋ f [r])(1 ＋ r)	→	0,
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(4.2)
For	borrower	types	X	and	Y,	if	there	exists	an	r	satisfying	(4.1),	then	the lowest value	of	
r,	denoted	by	r＊hereinafter,	defines	the	competitive rate	for	the	borrower.	Therefore,	if	
everything	is	continuous,	r＊ should	satisfy
(s [r＊] ＋νf	[r＊])	(1 ＋ r ＊ ) ≥	1 ＋ r.
	
Figure2:	borrower	types	and	ranges	of	competitive	rates.
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No	competitive	fund	manager	should	accept	any	borrower	in	category	Z.	Also,	fund	
managers	can	accept	a	borrower	 in	category	Y	only	 if	 the	borrower	can	expect	a	
suﬃciently	highν,	which	is	made	possibly	only	when	a	suﬃciently	high	fraction	of	
other	fund	managers	are	also	ready	to	accept	(i.e.,	refinance)	the	borrower.	This	is	
analogous	to	Proposition	1	in	section	3.
	 A	major	difference	here	 from	 the	previous	 section	 is	 the	competitiveness	of	
the	 lending	rates.	 In	a	competitive	equilibrium,	 lenders	are	kept	 indifferent	between	
trading	with	a	qualified	borrower	 (who	satisfies	 (4.1))	and	opting	out	 for	 the	safe	
alternative	 investment	which	earns	 r	with	certainty.	This	 implies	 that,	even	when	
a	borrower	 in	 either	 category	X	 or	 category	Y	 satisfies	 (4.1),	 a	 rational	profit-
maximising	lender	can	still	exercise	the	“discretion”	not	to	accept	the	borrower.	This	
implies	the	following.
Proposition 2	 :	 It	 is	a	competitive	equilibrium	if,	and	only	 if,	 the	fraction	of	 fund	
managers	accepting	a	borrower	with	s [·],	f [·]	satisfies
	 and	the	competitive	rate	for	any	accepted	borrower	is	determined	as
r＊＝min	{	r	|	(s	[r] ＋νf [r])	(1 ＋ r) ≥	1 ＋ r }	.
Compared	with	Proposition	1	and	Corollary	1,	 endogenisation	of	 lending	 rates	
can	enlarge	 the	possibility	of	discriminatory	 lending	denial.	Previously,	only	 those	
borrowers	in	category	Y	were	susceptible	to	possibly	discriminatory	“discretion”	by	
fund	managers.	Now,	not	only	category	Y	but	also	category	X,	economically	the	most	
“able”	borrowers,	can	be	subjected	to	fund	managers’	choosiness.	
	 Furthermore,	the	following	is	particularly	noteworthy.
Corollary 2 :	For	any	borrower	 in	either	category	X	or	category	Y,	 the	higher	the	
fraction	of	accepting	fund	managers,	the	lower	the	resulting	competitive	rates.
For	instance,	if	class-W	borrowers	in	category	X	are	accepted	by	all	fund	managers	
whilst	 class-B	borrowers	 in	category	X	 are	accepted	by	only	a	 relatively	 small	
θ
=	0	 for	any　(s [·],	f [·]) ∈ Z,
∈	[θ
∧
,	1]	 for	any　(s [·],	f [·]) ∈ Y,
∈	[0,	1]	 for	any　(s [·],	f [·]) ∈ X,
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fraction	of	fund	managers,	then	even	between	a	class-W	and	class-B	borrowers	with	
the	same	(s [·],	f [·]) ∈ X,	the	competitive	rate	for	the	class-W	borrower	is	lower	than	
that	for	the	class-B	borrower.
5．Imperfect competition
	 It	 is	 intriguing	 to	discover	 that	some	aspects	of	competition	are	contributing	
to	 credit	market	 discrimination.	 Competitiveness	 can	materialise,	 and	 be	
conceptualised,	 in	more	 than	one	way.	Accordingly,	 the	 impact	on	credit	market	
discrimination	 varies	 depending	 upon	 how	 the	market	 is	made	 imperfectly	
competitive.	
Long-term lending relations
	 As	aforementioned,	establishing	long-term	lending	relations	can	not	only	reduce	
the	room	for	discrimination	but	more	generally	enhance	intertemporal	eﬃciency	of	
lending	and	refinancing.
	 Realistically	 this	may,	 in	part,	 account	 for	 the	 “historical”	background	 for	
credit	discrimination.	Namely,	those	borrowers	who	have	had	established	long-term	
relations	with	 lenders	and	fund	managers	may	enjoy	preferential	 treatment	whilst	
those	who	has	less	established	history,	such	as	ethnic	minorities	consisting	mostly	of	
relatively	recent	immigrants,	may	face	diﬃculties,	provided all their economic credentials 
being equal and all lenders and fund managers being economically rational.
Supernormal profits
	 One	of	 the	most	common	ways	 to	quantify	competitiveness	 is	 the	presence	
or	 the	absence	of	supernormal	profits.	 In	 this	sense,	competitiveness	of	 the	credit	
market	implies	that	lenders	cannot	expect	to	earn	supernormal	profits.	As	shown	in	
the	previous	section,	this	can	have	a	very	direct	effect	of	making	lenders	indifferent	
between	accepting	and	not	accepting	a	perfectly	 “acceptable”	borrower.	 If	 the	
credit	market	were	 slightly	 less	competitive,	 so	 that	 lenders	could	expect	 small	
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but	nonnegligible	 supernormal	profits	 from	 lending,	 then	 they	would	no	 longer	
reject	a	borrower	“without	reason”.	This	not	only	eliminates	the	vast	multiplicity	of	
competitive	equilibria	in	Proposition	2	but	in	particular,	any θ∈ [0,	1)	for	category	X	
andθ∈ [θ
∧
,1)	for	category	Y	are	eliminated,	whereby	the	set	of	competitive	equilibria	
will	resemble	that	in	Proposition	1	and	Corollary	1.
Collusive lenders
	 In	lieu	of	supernormal	profits,	imperfect	competition	may	alternatively	be	defined	
as	each	individual	lender	and	/or	fund	manager	being	no	longer	“small”.	Namely,	if	a	
nonnegligible	mass	of	fund	managers	can	collude,	they	may	be	able	to	affect	ν .
	 It	 is	 intuitively	obvious	 that	collusion	 in	 the	direction	of	 reducing ν is	never	
profitable.	This	eliminates,	once	again,	any θ∈	[0,	1)	for	category	X	and θ∈ [ θ
∧
,	1)	
for	category	Y.	Furthermore,	even	when	for	some	borrowers	in	category	Y	the	status 
quo	is θ＝ 0,	if	more	than θ
∧
of	the	fund	managers	can	collude,	then	they	can	“jump”	
the	fraction	from	0	to θ
∧
and	thenceforth	the	fraction	can	“trickle	up”	to	1.
6．Policy implications
	 Even	 though	 imperfect	competition	can	eliminate	some	of	 the	multiplicity	of	
equilibria	and	thereby	can	serve	as	an	anti-discrimination	device	to	some	extent,	it	
does	not	necessarily	follow	that	the	policy	maker	should	therefore	strive	to	make	the	
credit	market	as	uncompetitive	as	possible.	For,	 imperfect	competition	could	often	
be	accompanied	by	obvious	negative	side-effects,	which	might	easily	outweigh	the	
possibly	positive	effects	of	anti-discrimination.
	 Before	concluding	this	paper,	it	is	worthwhile	to	investigate	the	possible	effects	
of	directly	prohibiting	discrimination	based	upon	classes3）.	 It	might	spontaneously	
appear	as	 if	 the	result	of	such	a	“class-blindness”	policy	could	entail	an	outcome	
that	 is	a	population-weighted	average	of	 the	previously	equilibrium	 treatment	of	
3）Such	prohibition	has	been	implemented,	for	 instance,	 in	automobile	insurance	and	health	insurance	
where	insurance	providers	are	generally	not	allowed	to	collect	information	about	the	race	or	ethnicity	
of	the	insured.
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each	class	of	borrowers.	Should	this	prediction	be	true,	then	if	the	population	mass	
of	 the	discriminated-against	class	 is	small	 relative	 to	 that	of	 the	discriminated-for	
class,	 the	regulated	outcome	would	vastly	 improve	the	treatment	of	 the	previously	
discriminated-against	class	in	exchange	for	a	relatively	small	sacrifice	the	previously	
discriminated-for	class	ought	to	endure.	From	a	“democratic”	point	of	view,	such	an	
outcome	would	be	highly	agreeable.
	 Upon	a	closer	inspection,	however,	this	spontaneous	prediction	may	not	always	
make	sense.	Return	 to	 the	model	presented	 in	section	4.	Suppose	 that	 there	 is	a	
subset	of	Y	where	only	class-W	borrowers	are	currently	offered	loans	whilst	class-B	
borrowers	are	rejected.	Now	consider	 imposing	a	class-blind	policy	requiring	 the	
same	treatment	for	both	classes	of	borrowers	whenever	their	types	s	[·]	and	f [·]	are	
identical.	The	result	from	this	policy	is	largely	a	matter	of	coordination.	One	of	the	
possible	ways	to	illustrate	this	situation	is	as	follows.
1．	If	 a	 fund	manager	 conjectures	 that	 all	 other	 fund	managers	 accept	 these	
borrowers	in	question,	and	hence	he/she	decides	to	accept	them	as	well,	then	:
•	 if	 the	conjecture	 turns	out	correct,	 then	the	 fund	manager	earns	a	normal	
profit	from	trading	with	these	borrowers	;
•	however,	if	the	conjecture	turns	out	incorrect	and	few	other	fund	managers	
in	fact	accept	these	borrowers,	then	he/she	suffers	a	subnormal	profit	from	
trading	with	these	borrowers.
2．	If	 a	 fund	manager	 conjectures	 that	 no	 other	 fund	managers	 accept	 these	
borrowers	in	question,	then	he/she	decides	to	decline	these	borrowers	and	hence	
will	 invest	 the	 fund	 in	 the	safe	alternative,	unconditionally	earning	a	normal	
profit.
Hence	by	weak	dominance,	 the	adjustment	 force	one-sidedly	 favours	not	 trading	
with	these	borrowers.
	 Obviously	this	is	not	the	only	possible	way	to	describe	the	adjustment	process	:
the	outcome	may	depend	upon	 the	 relation	between	 the	speed	of	adjustment	 in	
acceptance	rules	and	that	in	competitive	interest	rates.	A	more	detailed	investigation	
in	this	direction	can	be	a	subject	for	future	research.	Nevertheless,	the	above	suﬃces	
to	illustrate	in	the	most	intuitive	possible	way	why	the	seemingly	no-nonsense	anti-
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discrimination	regulation	might	not	bring	about	the	desired	effects.
7．Conclusion
	 By	means	of	a	relatively	 informal	simple	model,	 this	paper	has	demonstrated	
that	 credit	 discrimination	 based	 upon	 externally recognisable yet inherently non-
economic	classes	can	be	sustained	as	a	self-fulfilling	prophecy	even	without	hidden	
actions	 taken	by	 the	borrowers.	This	differs	 in	spirit	 from	much	of	 the	standard	
theoretical	explanation	based	upon	 the	“vicious	circle”	where	 the	borrowers	are	
mistreated	and	hence	are	 forced	 into	 risky	ways	of	 running	 the	borrowed	 fund,	
resulting	in	high	default	rates	which	in	turn	confirms	the	lenders’	expectation	about	
these	discriminated-against	borrowers.	The	 traditional	vicious	circle	 story	could,	
depending	upon	how	to	interpret	it,	be	used	to	“blame	the	victim”:	the	theory	gives	
little	clue	whether	the	chicken	was	first	or	the	egg	was	first	(therefore	theoretically,	
it	 is	never	clear	whether	the	victim	is	really	a	victim	or	merely	an	accomplice).	In	
this	paper,	on	the	contrary,	 it	 is	shown	that	discrimination	can	stand	alone	whilst	
the	victim	 is	entirely	blameless	 (and	hence	 is	unquestionably	a	victim	never	an	
accomplice).
	 As	a	final	note,	it	may	take	an	extra	care	to	apply	this	theory	empirically.	For,	
empirical	data	are	scarcely	helpful	in	inferring	the	contemplated	use	of	the	borrowed	
fund	when	 the	 loan	has	been	denied.	Factually,	however,	credit	discrimination	
appears	to	be	a	real	 issue	(see,	e.g.,	Blanchflower	et al,	1999)	whilst	moral	hazard,	
i.e.,	the	“hidden”	use	of	the	borrowed	funds	by	discriminated-against	borrowers,	has	
collected	scarce	evidence.
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